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The markét and thestate, operation and characteristícs oftwo institutions ofkey importance in the modern 
mixed economies, are investigated for the former socialist countries in this study. After two decades it 
can be seen more dearly what system has been established in the region, how it operates, and what its 
characteristícs are. In the first part ofthe with the help of international comparisons we examine how free 
the markét is, how good the rules are, and how much they help, or hinder, the fulfilment ofits function. 
From an other aspect we compare the scope of the good governance and the size, the freedom and 
efficiency ofthe state. According to the evidence ofthe international studies examined, the former socialist 
countries established the forms ofthe markét institutional system relatively quickly, but the operation and 
quality ofthese lagged significantly behind those ofthe developed countries. Alsó important conclusion of 
the study is that by the first decade ofthe millennium the characteristícs ofthe former socialist countries 
are increasingly diverging from one another. Both the characteristícs ofthe earlier socialism, and the more 
distant historical past which can be caught in the act within it, had and have an effect on the economic and 
social systems now established in Eastern and Central Europe. 
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Two decades have passed since 1990 when in Central Europe and further to the east the 
socialist systems collapsed and a historical transformationbegan: the adoption, introduction 
and domestication of the pattern of mixed economy established in the developed countries. 
Through a series of great hopes, endeavours and mistakes, the foundations of the new 
economy were laid in most countries during the first decade, a majority of priváté ownership 
was established, the institutions of markét economy were organised and in the fortunate 
countries all this was accompanied by the introduction of democracy. Institution building, 
partially at the suggestion of international institutions and consultants and partially in a 
spontaneous way, was based far more on the adoption of forms already established in the 
developed countries, rather than on their own, scarcely existent traditions, or on internál 
evolutionary forms. "Times Arrow" (Hayek 1989:151) played a significant role here; Hayek 
thus referred to the adoption of institutions förmed in an evolutionary way elsewhere. This 
can be "time's arrow" as it accelerates development, but at the same time the dangers of "organ 
transplant" can arise, in which the foreign environment may reject the institution obtained 
from elsewhere, or at least, it may result in dysfunctional operation. The opinion expressed 
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by North and his co-authors in their book (North- Wallis- Weingast 2008) essentially implies 
that it is impossible to copy the successful institutional system of the western way. 
The operation and characteristics of two institutions of key importance in the modern 
mixed economies, the markét and the state, are investigated for the former socialist 
countries in this study.. After two decades it can be seen more clearly what system has been 
established in the region, how it operates, and what its characteristics are. In the first part of 
the study an attempt is made to take stock of the "facts", then in the second, to analyse the 
operation of the institutions in our region based on the facts and theoretical considerations. 
Facts and tendencies 
Freedom ofthe markets 
The markét is one of the most complex institutions, and whilst it is of informál character in 
many of its manifestations, formai rules and institutions are indispensable for its satisfactory 
operation in the modern form. In today's mixed economies, the adequacy and quality of 
state, legal regulation are of key importance for operation of the markets. Precisely for this 
reason, evaluation of markét operation may and must be approached from several angles. 
We must examine how free the markét is, how good the rules are, and how much they help, 
or hinder, the fulfilment of its function. In order to analyse these areas, which are difficult 
to measure, I have applied the Economic Freedom of the World index (Gwartney-Lawson 
2009), long used and perfected by the Fraser Institute, which spans several decades between 
1970 and 2007, and which expanded its investigation from the beginning of the nineties to 
include the socialist countries1. 
The Economic Freedom of the World alsó examines several important subterritories, or 
produces a complex index as a derivation of these. The main territories: 
• size of government, (expenditures, taxes, enterprises) 
• legal structure and security of property rights (Rule of Law) 
• access to sound money 
• freedom to trade internationally 
• credit markét regulation 
• labour markét regulation 
• business regulation 
The investigation is focused on the extent to which indispensable regulation guarantees 
markét freedom, overall or in the most important territories. How much does it restrict or 
promote this freedom? 
' The index displays the values on a scale ofOto 10. 10 signifies totál freedom. Here in the study the indices have been 
transformed into values between 0 and 100, (multiplying the originál value by fenj, for the sake of easier comparison 
with the rest ofthe data underinvestigation. 
Figure 1. 
Average values of the Indexes of the Economic Freedom between 
1970 and 2007 (53 countries) 
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Figure 1 presents the average trends in the main indices in the period between 1970 and 
2007, taking into account data from 53 countries. Figure 2 shows the same averages for 121 
countries for a more restricted period, between 1995 and 2007. Figure 1 shows changes 
in the main indices over close to four decades, with respect to more than fifty countries. 
The first thing worthy of attention is that the period of crisis during the seventies checked 
the growth of economic freedom. The reduction occurred both on the credit and money 
markets, with a relatively high degree of freedom, and for the indices characteristic of the 
governmental and legal environment. Trends in the money and credit markét are typical 
of a boom to a significant extent, whereas the other two areas indicate that more powerful 
state intervention than formerly has occurred in the crisis. The fallback and stagnation of 
economic freedom lasted right up till the second half of the eighties, and in the nineties it 
once again attained the levél of two decades before. The turnaround occurred first of all in 
the credit and money markets. The upward trend begins here in the eighties, but here too, 
it is only in the nineties that the levél of the early seventies is attained. 
Figure 2. 
Average values of the Indexes of the Economic Freedom between 
1995 and 2007 (121 countries) 
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The nineties arrive with a decade of raised hopes, quiet growth and expanding globalisation. 
Freedom of the markets is growing, besides the money markets and foreign trade the bonds 
of the labour markét have alsó been loosed, but restraints on the government and the legal 
system have alsó eased. It is further observable, however, that economic freedom is relatively 
greater in the money and credit markets, and in the area of foreign trade, and this is served 
less by the role of the government, and the labour markét is traditionally stiff and inflexible. 
These deviations appear particularly strikingly in the developed countries of Europe. This 
ranking according to order of magnitude is alsó similar in the leading overseas economies, 
but there, a greater economic freedom may be observed overall, and particularly in the 
areas of government and the labour markét. 
The fmal years of the nineties and the turn of the millennium mark another turnaround. 
Growth of economic freedom slows down, particularly in the areas of the labour markét and 
the government. Freedom in foreign trade is restricted in the decelerating world economy 
after 2000, and business opportunities worsen. Interestingly, and even then as a warning 
sign, the greatest growth in freedom occurs in the credit markets after a more moderate rise 
in the nineties, and together with this, freedom of the money markets is alsó very high. A 
kind of global "runaway" in the money and credit sphere was perceptible even before the 
crisis of 2007/2008. 
The changes occurring from the mid-nineties can be examined on a broader national 
pattern, as data from more countries are available from that time. In Figure 2, trends in the 
indices can be seen with respect to various areas of economic freedom, now extending to 
121 countries. This considerably larger sample draws a broader sphere of less-developed 
countries into rangé. The main tendencies show a similar pattern to the previous sample. 
A striking change can be observed after the turn of the millennium: alongside the rising 
freedom of the money and credit markets, the freedom in foreign trade is reduced and 
the business freedom index worsens. A small scale improvement is perhaps perceived 
after 2005, but as we know, this period was the calm before the storm, as the storm of the 
financial and economic crisis has by now thoroughly rearranged the picture. After the turn 
of the millennium, therefore, the economic standstill can be felt in the real economy, but 
not at all in the area of the financial and credit sphere, indeed, the opposite tendency is 
more perceptible there. 
We naturally have no data with regard to next year, but based on long term experience, 
tendencies observable in the seventies and eighties, and the development of economic 
policy in recent years, a reduction in economic freedom is to be expected, with increasing 
interference and regulation by the government. And the recession could injure foreign 
trade, the business environment and the condition of the labour markét. Based on present 
developments, this could be an effect perceptible even over longer periods, which could 
make emergence of the awaited upswing more difficult. A vicious circle could be established, 
restriction of the markets and a broadening intervention, in spite of good intentions, could 
make growth more difficult, which may possibly stimulate the regulators and governmental 
players to renewed activity. 
Figure 3. 
Average values of the Indexes of the Economic Freedom between 
1995 and 2007 (15 former socialist countries) 
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In terms of our subj ect it is particularly important to see how the various elements of markét 
freedom developed in the former socialist countries during the period of transformation 
and institution building, which occurred incredibly rapidly from a historical perspective. 
Figure 3 shows the trends in the economic freedom indices in the period between 1995 and 
2007 for 15 widely differing former socialist countries2. These countries, with very different 
historical, developmental and cultural features, were facing similar challenges during this 
period, to build the markét and establish the basic institutions of a mixed economy 
Figure 4. 
Indexes of the Economic Freedom in Hungary between 1990 and 2007 
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The most dynamic, even tempestuous changes for the economies under transformation are 
shown by the freedom index of the money and credit markét. From a 30-40 percent value, 
in a decade they attained values close to 90 percent of that of the developed European 
economies, in fact, the Baltic States even exceeded this. Foreign trade and the legal system 
remain largely on the same levél in this period, the freedom of the labour markét and the 
government index climb slowly. Business freedom rises until the turn of the millennium and 
afterwards slowly decreases, similarly to the developed countries. The aggregáté freedom 
index does in fact rise, but a deciding factor in this is a jump in the increase in freedom of 
the credit and money markét. In truth the change between 1995 and 2007 is surprisingly 
small, if the credit and money markét indices are disregarded. Of the individual groups of 
economies in transformation, the economic freedom index is largest for the Baltic States, 
almost identical to that of the developed European countries. The state is alsó the freest 
here, distancing itself perhaps excessively from economic issues, though the price for this 
2
 The Visegrád Group, with Slovenia alsó listed here, the Baltic States, in the southern group Croatia, Románia, Bulgária, 
Albánia and two CIS countries, Russia and Ukraine, as well as China. 
was paid in the crisis. (Csaba 2009) The Visegrád Group comes next, in this study including 
Slovenia, which is similar in many ways. The southern states come next, with China and 
Russia at the end. It can be stated, therefore, that the most developed groups of the former 
socialist countries, the Baltic States and the Visegrád Group, in respect of the economic 
freedom index had largely fallen into line with the developed European economies by the 
middle of the first decade of the third millennium. The development of Hungary alsó fits in 
with this trend, as can be sensed from Figure 4. 
The average index of economic freedom rose continuously in Hungary between 1990 
and 2007, but here too the money markét and the credit markét is the decisive driving 
force, in particular between 1990 and 1995, as well as between 2000 and 2005. It appears 
peculiar, however, that the freedom index for the legal requirements system has been falling 
since 1995. Remission of the business freedom index after 2000, on the other hand, follows 
international tendencies. The government index is very low in the nineties, though this 
improved somewhat in the decade from 2000. 2005 shows a break in the case of Hungary, 
growth of almost all the indices came to a halt. 
The forms of the markét institutions, with emphasis on the word forms, were more or 
less established in the Visegrád and Baltic States, according to the evidence of the economic 
freedom indices. According to experience, however, these did not operate anywhere near as 
well as in the developed countries. It is worth taking a good look at the quality of operation, 
in order to obtain a more subtle picture of the transformation process. 
Good governance 
The international study examining the expansion of economic freedom as analysed in 
the previous section primarily compares the formation and developmental state of the 
institutional frameworks. More information on the nature and quality of their operation 
can be obtained from the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project, 
which has already extended its survey to 212 countries (Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi 2009). 
Those who produced the matériái have summarised their approach as follows: "We define 
governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound 
policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic 
and social interactions among them." (Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi 2009:5) 
The six dimensions of governance that they measure corresponding to their definition 
are: 
• Voice and Accountability 
• Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
• Government Effectiveness 
• Regulatory Quality 
• Rule of Law 
• Control of Corruption 
As can be seen, the study attempts to grasp the correct operation of the institutions in these 
six dimensions3. Data from this study with respect to 2007 are presented in Figure 5 for 
a number of country groups and for Hungary. It can be clearly perceived from Figure 5 
that compared with the developed European markét economies, even the most developed 
countries in transition are lagging behind to a much more signifkant extent than in the 
case of the economic freedom indices examined above. The Visegrád and the Baltic States 
are on a closely similar levél, but a much larger divergence is seen for the rest of the former 
socialist countries. This indicates that though the institutional forms may be similar in 
many ways to those in the model countries, the efficiency and quality of their operation lag 
signincantly behind. 
Figure 5. 
Indexes of the World Governance Indicators - 2007 
Source: Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi 2009 
The WGI indices for one country from each of the groups of former socialist states 
mentioned above are shown in Figure 6. Of these, Hungary and Estonia lie closest to 
the developed European countries, Russia and Albánia the furthest away, and Románia 
occupies an intermediate position. In generál, the divergence is smaller in the indices for 
regulation and democratic forms, and is the largest in the area of corruption and the rule 
of law. 
3
 A methodological description of the World Governance Indicators may be found in: Kaufmann - Kraay - Mastruzzi, 
2009. In the individual areas, the indices show the ranking ofthe individual countries by percentage. In contrast to the 
Economic Freedom ofthe World test, experts ofthe World Bank do not use a single, totalised WGI index, aggreqated from 
the six indices, taking into account the differences between the areas, which are clearly very diverse in character. In this 
study I regard the average ofthe 6 aggreqated indices as the WGI index, buti alsó place more emphasis on the individual 
territories. 
Indexes of the World Governance Indicators in somé former socialist 
countries - 2007 
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The values of the Economic Freedom of the World index with respect to 2007 are shown 
in Figure 7 for these same countries. A comparison of the two figures speaks for itself. In 
contrast to the WGI indices, the EFW indices of the countries under investigation are much 
closer to one another, and it is not at all certain that the economic freedom measured here is 
greater in a more developed country. The government, for instance, is the freest in Albánia, 
the labour markét in Románia, the business sphere and credit markét in Estonia, though 
in fact everything is very free everywhere, just like the money markét. In the developed 
Western European countries, on the other hand, the rule of law is higher than in the former 
socialist states featured here. 
It can be experienced from a comparison of the two extended international studies, and 
by taking broader contexts into account, that the international expansion of institutional 
forms may be rapid, but at the same time this does not mean that after their adoption 
and domestication they will work in a similar way to where they have been present for 
a long time. Good institutional operation depends on a huge number of factors, and in 
the developed countries many decades were needed for their evolution and for concerted 
operation. The WGI indices have only been available for just over a decade, but during this 
period the values in the developed countries have shown great stability, the ranking, index 
and positions of the individual countries with respect to one another have not changed 
much. This alsó indicates that the nature and quality of operation of the institutions is a 
result of complex factors and to a large extent is based on historic, traditional considerations, 
which themselves are slow to change. In the decade in question, the political stability index 
worsened in generál in the developed countries, whilst that of regulation improved in most 
cases; the rest, on the other hand, display a large degree of stability. 
Figure 7. 
Indexes of the Economic Freedom in somé former socialist 
countries - 2007 
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Differing levels of quality are alsó found between the developed European countries with 
regard to operation of the institutions, as modelled by Figure 8. The highest levél is observed 
in the Scandinavian countries, the lowest in the states of Southern Europe. The other 
European countries are positioned between these two extrémé cases. In spite of the fact 
that Hungary occupies a relatively good position among the former socialist countries in 
terms of the WGI survey, it does lag behind the values of the Southern European countries, 
apart from the case of the regulation index. The shortfall is the greatest with regard to 
corruption and the rule of law, in comparison with all three groups of European countries. 
The institutes of political democracy and markét regulation, as alsó seen on Figure 5, are the 
two "strongest" territories both in Hungary and in the rest of the former socialist countries. 
Figure 8. 
Indexes of the World Governance Indicators in Europe 





Source: Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi 2009 
According to the evidence of the two international studies examined, the former socialist 
countries established the forms of the markét institutional system relatively quickly, but 
the operation and quality of these lagged significantly behind those of the developed 
countries. The formation of this latter, though, is a very slow and complex process, and no 
abrupt change could or did occur in this from the mid nineties. In the following, besides 
the markét, the development of the role and operation of the other important institution, 
the state, is investigated separately. This is particularly important in the case of the former 
socialist countries, as here a centralised planned economy, a society dominated by the 
state, was replaced by the idea and practice of the dominant mixed economy. The main 
player in this transformation process in Central and Eastern Europe was, paradoxically, the 
totalitarian state which was to be deconstructed and transformed. 
The size, freedom and efficiency ofthe state 
The importance of the state may most frequently be estimated by its magnitude, by its 
size compared with the GDP. This is a very important index or characteristic, even if it 
clearly provides a quantitative and not qualitative approach to an estimation of the state. 
International comparisons here are of course made more difficult, in that we cannot speak 
of uniíied tendencies or unequivocal trends even in countries of the developed world; very 
difFerent countries and types are encountered in this area too. 
This is clearly perceived in Figure 9 and Figure 10 too, where based on data from 
Government Fináncé Statistics, the magnitude of national expenditure in comparison with 
the GDP can be seen for 2005, for countries listed in increasing order according to GDP 
per capita. The highest value is observed for the developed states of Europe, for the leading 
overseas economies it is lower than this. At the higher developmental levél the governmental 
importance is generally greater, but the scatter is very large at every levél. Of the former 
socialist countries the value for Hungary is very high, and this is followed by Slovenia. 
An important question is, how do the governments of various sizes and the national 
expenditures relate to development of the economic freedom indices examined earlier, and 
alsó with the index estimating the quality of "good governance"? In Figure 11, the index 
with respect to the government is highlighted and presented from among all the EFW and 
the WGI indices, and compared with the magnitude of government expenditures. These 
indices are presented with the countries arranged as a function of their state of development. 
It can be seen that a greater governmental importance generally reduces the measure of 
economic freedom, but, and this is a very important lesson, the quality of government does 
not depend on its size, but much more on the developmental state of the country s economy 
and institutions. 
For the order according to developmental state in Figure 11, there is a close correlation 
between the WGI index related to government and the developmental state. More detailed 
analyses alsó show that the quality of governmental activity in closely related to the levél of 
economic development. The varying extent of the role played by the state could alsó involve 
similar effects. It is clearly perceived how many different things are meant and how many 
diverse concepts are covered by the frequently mentioned expressions "major" state or 
"strong" state 
Figure 9. 
General government expenditures in 45 countries in the % of GDP - 2005 
Source: GFS 2007, Maddison 2003, IFS 2008 
Figure 10. 





Source: OECD 2009:295, Maddison 2003, IFS 2008 
Figure 11. 
General government expenditures and WGI Government indexes - 2005 
(45 countries) 
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Figure 12. 
General government expenditures, EFW Government indexes - 2005 
(45 countries) 
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Both Figure 11 and analysis of the data for the countries show, that on the WGI scale, the most 
developed countries have attained such a high levél in the governmental operation index 
that in the very highest "class" the value of every single member is similarly outstanding. 
This is indicated in the figure by the flattening of the WGI governmental index at the levél 
of the highest developmental state. 
In Figure 12, the countries are featured in order of the magnitude of national expenditure 
rather than developmental state in comparison with the GDP. Alsó in this case it is 
experienced that there is no close connection between size and the WGI governmental 
index, the latter are scattered to a large extent, as seen on the Figure. The connection 
between the extent of the state and the freedom index with regard to the government is 
all the stronger, and not surprisingly inverted. This is a clear and close correlation; it is no 
coincidence that, as has been seen earlier, of the former socialist countries it is Albánia 
which has the greatest governmental freedom, which in reality often signifies the weak and 
powerless effect of the role played by the state. 
With a chart reminiscent of a flower, Figure 13 summarises the lessons learnt so far 
from the comparative analyses carried out in this section. The 45 countries included in 
the study can be seen in the figure in the order of significance of national expenditure, this 
is shown by the diagram in the middle. The governmental index of economic freedom is 
the next on the figure, which is larger for the smaller states, and much smaller for those 
with extensive national expenditure. The outermost, irregular "flower petal" is the index 
estimating governmental efíiciency 
A combination of the three indices studied shows that the developed capitalist 
economies differ from one another in many ways, as regards the role played by the state. 
This is alsó true within Europe, but at the same time this analysis reinforces the differences 
between developed economies of Europe and those overseas. These are alsó well perceived 
from Figures 14 and 15. As can be seen in Figure 14, the three large groups of developed 
European countries, southern, Scandinavian and the rest of the European economies, the 
determinative members of which are Continental type states but in this regard the United 
Kingdom may alsó be listed here, in part display divergent characteristics. A common 
feature is that the ratio of the national expenditure to the GDP is relatively high, but whilst 
in the southern states the WGI governmental index as a measure of quality features is 
relatively low, a value close to the maximum is found in the Scandinavian countries. In the 
continental economies this value is located between the two. 
Figure 13. 
General government expenditures, EFW and WGI Government indexes - 2005 
(45 countries) 
Source: GFS 2007, Gwartney-Lawson 2009, IFS 2008, Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi 2009 
Figure 14. 
Government expenditures, EFW and WGI Government indexes, Europe - 2005 
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Government expenditures, EFW and WGI Government indexes, 
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At the same time, the overseas developed countries show a relatively unified picture. The 
national expenditure proportion is lower than in the European countries, the governmental 
freedom index higher, and a picture of a very efficient state is delineated on Figure 15. 
The former socialist countries 
We have already seen that in spite of the twenty year transformation process, the overall lag 
behind the developed countries is rather large. If the national expenditure, the EFW and 
the WGI governmental indices are alsó compared in more detail in the other half of Europe, 
in the former socialist lands, even in the leading countries, characteristics similar to the 
southern group of the more developed European states are found. A similar conclusion 
could be reached earlier for the indices showing governmental quality on Figure 5. Values 
for 13 economies in transformation are presented on Figure 16. 
Figure 16. 
Government expenditures, EFW and WGI Government indexes -









Source: GFS 2007, Maddison 2003, Gwartney-Lawson 2009, IFS 2008 
Kaufmann-Kraay-Mastruzzi, 2009 
Due to data restrictions, only these economies in transition could be analysed now, but 
even so, groups with differing characteristics can be outlined. 9 countries, the majority 
of the 13 examined, are members of the European Union, 4 are not. With regard to their 
developmental state, Albánia is to be found at the end of the line, as well as the two successor 
states of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Ukraine. In these countries the value of the 
index measuring the quality of government is very low, besides this the magnitude of 
national expenditure in Albánia and Russia is low, around 30%, and the state is very "free". 
A small but powerless state is found here. In Ukraine, on the other hand, the national 
expenditure encapsulates 43-44% of the GDP, so it sits more firmly on the economy than in 
the two countries mentioned previously, and allows less freedom. Its efficiency, however, is 
similarly low. Here a large but powerless state is seen. 
The fourth non-EU country is Croatia, though it is supposedly close to joining. According 
to the phenomena examined here it appears ripe for accession, as it is economically more 
developed and the operation of the state more efficient than in Románia or Bulgária. 
Figure 17. 
Government expenditures, EFW and WGI Government indexes -
Former socialist countries - 2005 
Of the EU member states, the two countries which joined later, Bulgária and Románia, are 
at a lower levél of development than the states of the first cycle, and their governmental 
efficiency is alsó lower. The proportion of national expenditure is somewhat higher in 
Bulgária than in Románia, and the governmental freedom index here is the lowest of all 
the 12 countries examined. All of the Visegrád States are featured in the sample, including 
Slovenia too. With regard to the national expenditures Slovakia has "leit" this group, having 
managed to reduce the formerly high levél to under 40 percent, thus approaching the Baltic 
States. At the same time, the governmental efficiency index is the second highest here after 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia, and the governmental freedom index is the largest of all 
the Visegrád Group. In all these characteristics, it displays similarity with the Baltic States 
featured here, Lithuania and Estonia. The Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovenia 
can be listed in the "remnant" Visegrád Group. In these the governmental efficiency 
index is high, but so is the magnitude of national expenditure compared to the GDR The 
governmental freedom index, however, is relatively low. 
From an examination of the former socialist countries, it can be seen that by the first decade 
ofthe millennium the overweight state of the previous period has lost ground everywhere, 
but the magnitude is diverse even now. The national expenditure centralisation is the 
highest in the Visegrád States, with values between 42 and 50%. It has fallen below 40% 
in Slovakia, and is around the same in Croatia. In the Baltic States it is around 35%. In 
the less developed countries under investigation the magnitude of national expenditure 
centralisation is very scattered, 43-44% in Ukraine, and less than 30% in Albánia. The 
GWI index for governmental efficiency, however, shows a close correlation with the 
developmental state of the countries studied, as can be seen in Figure 17. It is the highest in 
the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia, and the lowest in Ukraine, Russia and Albánia. 
The governmental freedom index shows a diversified picture. Similarly to the 
experiences in the broader international study, on the one hand the value is high for the 
largely undeveloped countries, and alsó for more developed economies which have a state 
with less weight but greater efficiency. Russia and Albánia can be listed with the former, 
perhaps the Baltic States with the latter. Estonia has the highest EFW governmental index, 
greater than 80%, and Lithuania is the third highest with only Albánia (!) between them. 
For the Baltic States, however, as indicated earlier, this could alsó signify a powerless state 
in a certain sense. [Csaba 2009) 
A different manifestation ofthe operation of institutions 
In the preceding, an attempt has been made to present the quality of the operation of 
institutions in the economies in transition. In international comparative studies, the 
magnitude and extend of corruption is alsó used as a kind of gauge or "mirror" of the 
operation of institutions (Keren-Ofer 69). High corruption can alsó be a kind of index 
number of the low levél of efficiency in operation of the state and the administration of 
justice. 
Besides the earlier comparisons, another test for measuring economic freedom is 
included in Figure 18. A joint test of the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal 
(Holmes- Miller 2010) is the Index of Economic Freedom (WEF). This alsó includes an index 
related to corruption, as does the World Governance Indicators test. These two indices are 
shown on Figure 18 for various country groups. Besides this, the Heritage/Wall Street index 
constitutes two indices with regard to the government. In a similar way to the other two 
tests, one of them is the governmental freedom index, which basically corresponds to the 
dimension of the state. The other is linked with the activity of the state: this is the íiscal 
policy freedom index. 
Figure 18. 
Government expenditures, EFW and WGI Government indexes - 2005 
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In Figure 18, a striking difference is shown up between the various country groups. This 
corresponds more or less to what was experienced for the WGI governmental index. The 
corruption indices, particularly calculated according to WEF, display very signiíicant 
differences. In developed Europe, the Scandinavian countries come out the best and the 
southern states the worst. But even these latter signify a better levél than the leading 
economies under transformation. The government, on the other hand, provides greater 
freedom in the undeveloped countries, exercising less influence on the economy here. 
A broader picture has been sketched by including the developed capitalist countries, 
then the former socialist country group has been analysed. 
State and markét in the former socialist countries 
Europe is the birthplace of modern societies. A long road lasting many centuries led to 
the development of the capitalist economies by the 19 t h -20 t h centuries. In the interactive 
process of world economy, a society based on the markét and value improvement became 
determinative. Former "economic worlds" (Braudel 1992) were integrated into a "world 
economy". The markét became the dominant form for the organisation of production. In 
the countries providing the pattern, organic evolution lasting several centuries has created a 
model which signifies, or may well signify a goal to be achieved for a great many countries, 
but at the same time it is questionable whether it is at all possible to copy, overtake, or even 
outdistance these societies (North-Wallis-Weingast 2008). The complexity of the process, 
and the significance of the evolutionary development of the institutions is indicated by the 
work of Friedrich Hayek, and the concept of "Extended Order" which he uses. As he wrote: 
"our civilization depends, not only for its origin but alsó for its preservation, on what can 
De precisely described only as the extended order of humán cooperation, an order more 
commonly, if somewhat misleadingly, known as capitalism" (Hayek 1989:6). 
During the last century, mainly following the Second World War, the state took on an 
increasingly greater role in the leading markét economies, and by today it is quite justified 
to call them mixed economies. At the same time, this role played by the state evolved in a 
markét environment, where the two institutions constantly interacted with one another. It 
is alsó highly essential, that although quiet, the markét was and remains the determinative 
force in this, and not the "noisy" state. The state was förmed over a period of decades by 
a process of gradual refinement, and the better the accord between the two institutions, 
the greater the efficiency of operation, whereas if they broke away from one another, 
this led to increasing operational defects. The direction of development proceeded from 
the markét to the greater state, in an organic way, though not always without conflicts. 
Although the developed western world was affected by the great world wars, development 
was still unbroken, two or three centuries having been available for this. Taking a close look 
at the members of the "elité" club, a great many differences are of course found, but they 
still belong to one family and are members of one system. Thinking in terms of a systems 
approach, their coherent common features form a characteristic unit. (Kornai 2000) 
The socialist economies förmed a different system, the characteristícs of which alsó hung 
together as arranged in a unit. (Kornai 1992). In order for this system to have become 
naturalised at all, particularly in Russia, the land of its birth, there were long and deeply 
embedded historical and social precedents. (Berend 2006) These regions of Central and 
Eastern Europe were passed over by the mainstream of Europe as sketched out about, or 
at least they played a subordinate role for many centuries (Szűcs 1988). Here the change of 
régime from feudalism to capitalism came about late and in a distorted way at the end of the 
19 t h, beginning of the 20 t h century. And this occurred decisively not as a result of internál 
organic evolution, but under the disruptive influence of the expanding modern world 
system. In the decades of crisis following the First World War, totalitarian systems came 
into being in the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions: fascism and socialism. (Berend 
1998) The communist takeover of power in Russia at the same time meant the replacement 
of the capitalist system, still being established in a truncated form, by a centralised planned 
economy carrying out forced industrialisation in the hopes of catching up. 
Following the Second World War, once again in consequence of world political 
circumstances, this expanded into the area of Central-Eastern Europe. There where it was 
born, in the Soviet Union, the great experiment failed by the end of the century. It collapsed 
and feli apart there, burying under itself the satellite states too. The same capitalist system, 
which over many centuries of organic evolution developed the leading economies and 
societies in the centre with centrifugai dynamics, repelled the states on the edge of the 
system in a centripetal way, or left areas of vacuum where totalitarian systems could and 
did break in. These never signified a historical alternative, however, their downfall was of 
necessity, but they demanded incredible sacrifices from a succession of generations. 
The centralised planned economies had collapsed by the nineties, once again resulting 
from external influences in Central-Eastern Europe. The previously detached elements 
were "restored to favour" by the capitalist world economy. Over one long century the 
countries of this region had been affected by three changes of régime, not once according 
to its own "time table". From feudal, traditional society, in a rather imperfect way, somehow, 
they switched over to capitalist methods, then the system of socialism "broke in". After this 
had collapsed, they "received" the mixed economy model, which had evolved by then, and 
which they now had to follow. What a difference - organic evolution over several centuries, 
or constantly accepting historical influences from outside. In the developed countries, the 
extended system seen today has been grounded on the evolutionary development of formai 
and informál institutions over centuries. The fate of the Central-Eastern Europe countries, 
on the other hand, has been determined much more by historical impacts and external 
influences with regard to their internál development in the modern age. As expressed by 
Hayek, historical accidents alsó play an important role in development, and the role of 
these may be compared to the significance of mutations in evolution (Hayek 1988:20). 
But we alsó know from evolutionary processes, that mutations may of course advance 
development, even by leaps and bounds, but in other cases they very frequently can and do 
signify a dead end. 
It is worth while examining and evaluating the transformation process and institution 
building in the former socialist countries over the last two decades with regard to their 
position in this broader historical stream. Over four decades, these states constructed a 
distinctive institutional system, in which the state and bureaucratic coordination were 
determinative, and the markét could only affect things in an extremely limited way. Here 
the formai institutions dictated by socialism were determinative, and these were established 
rapidly and forcibly with centralised control. The institutions coming from outside settled 
on the lives of generations who had been socialised in a completely different social system. 
"Resolution" of the inevitable conflict was partially accomplished by dictatorial suppression, 
though explosive "failures" occurred at times, such as in 1953 in Berlin, in 1956 in Poznan 
and then in Hungary. What perhaps signified an even greater problem for operation of the 
socialist system was that the rapidly established institutions stood in sharp contrast to the 
deeply rooted customs, traditions and values, which further aggravated the low efficiency 
typical of the system from the start.The socialist period of Central-Eastern Europe spanned 
four decades and two generations. At the time of the change of régime the great majority of 
the active population and the bulk of those carrying out the changes had been socialised in 
the centralised planned economy system, where there is a sharp contrast between the levél 
of the formai and informál institutions, but the influence is not at all just in one direction. 
Not only is the operation of the institutions introduced from outside modified by the 
attitűdé and approach of the population, but the latter is alsó constantly shaped by the 
socialist set-up. 
The break-up of the Soviet Union alsó "liberated" Central-Eastern Europe, where a 
further change of régime commenced with tempestuous speed. It is true that this now 
opened the door to the mainstream of world economic development, and in contrast to the 
situation after the Second World War, the adoption of a successful model was on the agenda. 
The constant challenge of many centuries was once again on the agenda: to catch up with 
the most highly developed states of the continent and the world. The "conceitedness" of the 
centralised planned economy (Hayek 1988) was swept away by the storm of the historical 
change of régime, but it is as if the states of the region and their expert consultants feli 
into somewhat similar illusions. Now it is not the socialist system which must be built 
deliberately, with centralised control, but the markét economy, the modern mixed economy. 
The situation was contradictory, after all, over the four decades of communism these 
countries had dropped out of the mainstream of development and lagged behind the majority 
of the world in many ways. There was no other option than rapid building of the markét as 
directed by the state; the "visible hand" fashioned the "invisible hand" indispensable for the 
new system. This accelerated development, in contrast to the historical route, led from the 
state to the markét here rather than the other way round. On the one hand the state had to 
build the markét institutions, on the other, it had to deconstruct its previous dominance, 
its almost exclusive economic authority. To demolish and transform itself, and construct its 
0wn antithesis, is no everyday challenge. 
Besides this, something had to be established in the region which had never existed 
here; this system evolved in its modern form elsewhere, and it had to be replanted here. A 
"living" organism had to be created by inorganic, radical intervention, which would later 
be capable of organic advancement. The heightened role of the state in the change of régime 
was not completely new in the region, after all, it was alsó perceptible in the transformation 
from feudalism to capitalism and industrialisation, particularly in the eastern centre of the 
region and on its edge (Gerschenkron, 1962, Berend-Ránki 1974). In the second, socialist 
transformation, of course, state control was self evident and exclusive. The clarity of the 
situation helped to determine the pattern to be followed, and in truth, taking more or less 
similar steps, within a short time the countries of the region had established the framework 
of the new system and the most important institutions, and the importance and role of 
the state had been driven back or transformed. This can alsó be easily perceived from an 
empirical analysis of the first section of this study. 
Beside the institutions at the macro-level, micro-level transformation was alsó an 
important step: establishment of the modern corporate sphere. The institution building by 
the state provided a framework for this, but it could not have implemented it by itself. The 
truly significant breakthrough here was represented by the adoption and inrush of foreign 
patterns, in which a key role was played at the régiónál levél by a significant influx of capital. 
This is really no novelty in the region, as at the end of the 19 t h century, beginning of the 
20 t h, foreign capital alsó played a prominent role in the first capitalist transformation. At the 
present time the most successful players in the competitive sector are in foreign hands, as is 
the bulk of the banking sector. At the same time a significant proportion of enterprises with 
domestic capital today are unable to compete on the international markets; a kind of dual 
corporate structure has come into being. 
Institution building occurred relatively rapidly and successfully in the region of Central-
Eastern Europe, and the more developed was the country in transition, the more successful 
was the adoption of the institutional patterns fashioned in the developed countries, as least 
at far as the forms are concerned. This has been seen earlier in the international comparative 
study for the case of the Visegrád and Baltic States. At the same time it has alsó been seen, 
and reinforced by much additional experience, that the efficiency of operation of these 
institutions lags considerably behind those observed in the model states. In fact, according 
to our investigations, during the period from the rapid transformation in the nineties until 
today, after domestication of the new system, this efficiency has not improved further. It has 
more or less stabilised at a relatively low levél, in fact, a fali is observed in certain places. 
Three changes of régime within a century, induced from outside, provide a common 
lesson in one way. Transformation and reform of formai institutions is much easier than 
retailoring the informál institutions, customs, conventions and traditions interlacing the 
society and the economy, and adjusting to the new forms. In fact, it is very often these 
deeply influential traditions and means of behaviour which modify the newly established 
institutions. As Hayek wrote in the foreword to the American edition of the Road to 
Serfdom: "the political ideals of a people and its attitűdé toward authority are as much the 
effect as the cause of the political institutions under which it lives." (Hayek 2007:48) 
Socialism was born in Russia, in the midst of a historical dilemma in many ways. 
After the Second World War this model, the "uniform" of classical socialism was pulled 
over countries with very different traditions and stages of development, from Mongólia to 
Poland, from Albánia to Hungary. The "clothes" may have been the same, but they were worn 
and tolerated differently by the various societies, and this rebounded on the quality and 
formation of socialism in the individual countries. The more developed an affected country 
was, the more the effects of the earlier bourgeois mentality came to the fore, and the stronger 
was the contrast between the levels of the formai and the informál institutions. This is why 
the explosions of various kinds occurred in the most developed members in the fifties. The 
socialist model is much more suitable, at least for a time, for the quantitative development 
of countries at a low developmental stage, than for the operation of moderately developed 
economies. Expressed another way, there is a much greater loss of efficiency resulting from 
the non-market system in this latter case. An increase in the relative shortfall compared with 
the markét economies occurred specifically as a result of these losses. 
Alongside much that was identical, therefore, the socialist countries alsó differed in 
many ways. One of the main reasons for this is rooted in the fact that when the change 
of régime occurred after the Second World War, the conventions, cultures and traditions 
of the Central-Eastern European countries were very divergent. Citizens who had been 
socialised under the earlier system had "built", fashioned, förmed and of course endured the 
new system for decades. By the time the generations born into socialism were entering aduit 
life in the seventies and eighties, the system was already approaching its end. More apparent 
aspects of the differences between the countries were, for instance, the appearance of markét 
socialism in Hungary and Poland, and the short-lived experiment of Prague Spring in 1968. 
Problems with the system appeared more sharply and more perceptibly in the western 
area of the eastern bloc, in the more developed countries, and in order to handlé these, 
they had to "sacrifice" more resources than the less developed members. The way to do this, 
essentially due to the nature of the system, was primarily to raise the levél of communal 
consumption, and to a lesser extent increase personal consumption. Certain possibilities for 
change-over presented themselves to the leaders of the system, from the application of the 
violent instruments of dictatorship to the increase of consumption. The Soviet Union, or for 
instance Románia, leaned generally towards the first pole, but this was much more difficult 
to apply in the more civilised countries. Partly due to the more democratic traditions, and 
partly because of the nearness of the west, the example of the standard of living there being 
perceptible in spite of closed borders. 
As Yevgeni Preobrazhensky had already sketched out in the 1920s, alarmingly but with 
haunting foresight, the centralised planned economies (Preobrazhensky 1926), regrouped 
all resources into forced industrialisation, and in this a decisive role was played by keeping 
wages low and the accumulation rate extremely high. At the beginning, this could be 
represented as a temporary sacrifice made for future abundance, "dorít eat the goose that 
lays the golden egg", but not for ever. There was no way abundance was coming. The real 
situation was masked by that bogus illusion, that wages are low because the state will take 
care of all needs, free of charge, such as education, medication, pensions, recreation, etc. The 
ideology of paternalism, mainly at the beginning, served the purpose of things being taken 
away from the population on the whole, rather than given to them. 
In the less developed states applying a more severe dictatorship, this remained characteristic 
throughout the whole period of the system. At the time of the change of régime in the 
nineties, the socialist state was presented as the cause of oppression and deprivation. In 
the more developed region, naturally to varying degrees here too, the state redistributed 
more back to the population in the form of social benefits, and at the time of the changes 
this was fixed in their consciousness as a state role to be retained. Beyond this is fact, many 
long term promises were made on maintaining the socialist state in the future. In generál, 
however, even in these countries the importance of consumption as a whole was low, in 
particular personal consumption. From the other side, of course, the efficiency of the 
economies was of a very poor standard, as became clear at lightning speed from the markét 
trial performed by means of liberalisation in the nineties. As a result, the redistribution 
affecting the population at varying levels, and the fixing of this in the expectations of the 
people, created differing situations in terms of what was expected from the state in the 
individual economies in transition. Though important in terms of our subject, a stronger 
or weaker paternal attitűdé is of course just one consequence of the differing developmental 
routes taken by the counties. 
Looking in the longer term at the development in the region, fragmented as it is by 
external shocks, a kind of interactive, dual spirál can be considered. Generations living 
in a given system are borne by a current which is partially determined by the framework 
of characteristic institutions, but alsó strongly influenced by traditions and conventions 
carried forward and inherited from earlier times. The formai institutions influence people's 
concepts and actions, but at the same time, the people alsó fashion their own institutions 
and their operation. If this occurs as long-term, organic evolution, then there is time for 
the two spheres to develop harmoniously. Over the period of the last hundred years in 
Central-Eastern Europe, this was not the case. At the end of the 19 t h century, the forms 
of behaviour, traditions and expectations established over the previous centuries found 
themselves relatively rapidly in a strange formai institutional system which had come from 
outside. A hard struggle by a succession of generations was needed in order to adapt, but in 
the meantime capitalism became something essentially different from in the leading model 
countries. Modernisation of the region was burdened with feudal elements even in the 
20 t h century. A peculiar fragmentation of the dual spirál was alsó caused by the collapse of 
empires in the First World War, which involved the formation of new national boundaries. 
This had a significant effect not only on the formai institutions, but alsó on the informál. 
New national states came into being, old empires and national communities disintegrated. 
In this situation, following a further world conflagration, the second change of régime 
occurred, totally inflicted from outside: the rapid and violent introduction of socialism. 
Conventions and behaviours in sharp contradistinction to the semi-feudal, semi-
bourgeois traditions once again adapted over generations of suffering to the new system, 
but meanwhile they alsó modified it, in somewhat differing ways according to region and 
country. Of course, this alsó rebounded on these same generations, but more especially on 
the younger age-groups. By the time the generations growing up under the latest system 
could take on an active, formative role, a further change of régime had swept through the 
region. 
Copying and domesticating the mixed economy model established by lengthy organic 
evolution in the developed countries became the common, but alsó individual task for 
the countries of the region. For the most part, implementation feli upon the generations 
socialised under the socialist system. The new system was born 20 years ago, but its children 
have not yet appeared on the scene, nor could they. In the coming decades they will, but 
these are still before us. Interestingly enough, in parallel with the new change of régime, the 
map of the region was once again significantly redrawn. The establishment of new states 
overshadowed the picture, which naturally signifies formai institutional changes, but it has 
at least as much effect at the deeper levél of informál institutions. 
A result of the dual spirál outlined above, is that by the first decade of the millennium the 
characteristics of the former socialist countries are increasingly diverging from one another. 
It alsó follows from this that the model is not working at all as described in the textbooks 
of the western model countries, or as many had expected when the change of régime 
occurred. Both the characteristics of the earlier socialism, and the more distant historical 
past which can be caught in the act within it, had and have an effect on the economic 
and social systems now established in Eastern and Central Europe. The chief vehicle is 
the informál institutional system, forming very slowly and under the influence of many 
factors, the current of customs, traditions, values, unwritten rules, beliefs and myths passed 
down from generation to generation, and the dynamic interaction of these with the formai 
institutions. A very significant part of all this is what type and character of state and what 
kind of markét was förmed in the mixed economies established from above and by external 
influences after the nineties, and how the relationship between these was established. And 
it is particularly important how the institutions are linked with the concepts, expectations, 
customs and traditions of the generations who live in them, considering that three changes 
of régime have occurred in the region within the lifetime of a totál of 6-8 generations, and 
a number of state boundaries were changed twice in the 20 t h century. 
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